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Abstract
We introduce financial constraints in a theoretical analysis of illegal immigration. Intermedi-
aries finance the migration costs of wealth-constrained migrants, who enter temporary servitude
contracts to repay the debt. These debt/labor contracts are easier to enforce in the illegal than
in the legal sector of the host country. Hence, when moving from the illegal to the legal sector
becomes more costly—for instance, because of stricter deportation policies—fewer immigrants
default on debt. This reduces the risks for intermediaries, who are then more willing to finance
illegal migration. Stricter deportation policies may thus, ex ante, increase rather than decrease
the flow of illegal migrants. Furthermore, stricter deportation policies worsen the skill com-
position of immigrants. While stricter border controls decrease overall immigration, they may
result in an increase of debt-financed migration. We also show that there are complementarities
between employer sanctions and deportation policies. We use available evidence to check the
empirical consistency of the theory. (JEL: J61, K42, O17)
1. Introduction
Illegal migration is a problem of growing scale and importance. The most conser-
vative estimates (Skeldon 2000) amount to a worldwide stock of irregular migrants
exceeding 10 million. The International Organization for Migration reports that
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half of all new entrants into developed economies are illegal (IOM 2003). Accord-
ing to the United Kingdom Home Department, 75% of illegal migrants use the
expensive services of smugglers (see IOM 2003, p. 63). Migrants and their fami-
lies often cannot self-finance costs that commonly reach several tens of thousands
of US dollars. Hence, migrants indebt themselves. Smugglers and other interme-
diaries finance the costs of undocumented entry, and the debt repayment is taken
out of migrants’ wages in sweatshops and restaurants that are related to these
intermediaries (Chin 1999; IOM 2000).
Owing to its multi-billion US-dollar size (Kyle and Koslowski 2001) and
its inhumane nature, human smuggling causes much concern in public opinion.
Given increasing international wage differentials, unstable political circum-
stances, and the importance of financial constraints in most source countries of
migration, the demand for human smuggling services may rise further. It is there-
fore important to consider the interactions between wealth-constrained migrants
and intermediaries in an economic theory of illegal migration. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first attempt to carry out such analysis.
There are three types of policies against illegal immigration: (i) border con-
trols; (ii) deportation and legalization policies; and (iii) work-site inspections,
raids, and sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants. In our basic the-
ory, we focus on the first two policies, and study the third type of policies in
an extended model (Section 7). In Ethier’s (1986) model on illegal migration
and other papers building on his work, all these policies have similar, negative
effects on illegal immigration. The effect of border controls in our framework is
similar to the literature, but the effect of stricter deportation policies differs sub-
stantially. In our model, stricter deportation policies increase rather than decrease
the flow of illegal migrants. We also show that they worsen the skill composition
of immigrants.
We derive these results in a simple model of financial contracting between
wealth-constrained migrants and intermediaries. The model is motivated by and
based on the sociological evidence about the relationship between intermediaries
and immigrants, which we summarize in Section 2. We lay out the model in
Section 3 and analyze it in Section 4. In the model, there is a source country from
which workers may wish to migrate to earn higher wages in the host country.
In the host country there are an illegal and a legal sector. Migration costs must
be paid up front, but many potential migrants do not have enough cash. Wealthy
intermediaries/smugglers can provide migrants with funds. If the migrant has no
collateral, there is only one way to make the debt contract between intermediary
and migrant enforceable. The migrant commits himself to work exclusively for
the intermediary in the source country until the debt is paid back. We will refer
to these contracts as “debt/labor contracts.”
Debt/labor contracts collide with labor law. As long as a migrant is employed
in the illegal sector, the debtholders can enforce the contract through coercion.
“zwu005060386” — 2006/10/20 — page 1087 — #3
Friebel and Guriev The Costs of Illegal Migration 1087
This is more difficult when a migrant is legalized, because in the legal sector of
the economy the migrant receives some protection from the host country’s legal
system. Thus, migrants who move successfully to the legal sector can default
on their debt payment. However, there are costs associated with moving: In the
legal sector, migrants become visible to law enforcement agencies. This exposes
them to higher risks of being deported to the source country. When deportation
policies become stricter, migrants are hence less likely to try moving to the legal
sector and there are, then, fewer defaults on debt repayments. This implies that
financing migrants becomes more rewarding for intermediaries and, hence, that
the flow of migrants financed by debt/labor contracts increases. At the same time,
the net present value of migration for wealthier self-financed migrants decreases,
which reduces their inflow. The net effect on total migration flows is ambigu-
ous, but migrant skill composition deteriorates unambiguously, given the strong
positive correlations between wealth and skills in developing countries (Piketty
2000).
Our results hold under the following crucial assumptions. First, we presume
that migrants’ wealth constraints are binding. Our theory therefore applies mainly
to long-haul migration, for instance from China or South Asia to the US or EU,
where migration costs are too high to be paid up front. It may be less appropriate
for short-haul migration, for instance, between Mexico and the US, or Albania
and Italy, although even here, prices for illegal immigration appear substantial,
making it more likely that migrants need external sources of finance. Second,
it is more difficult to enforce the debt/labor contract when migrants have suc-
cessfully moved to the legal sector of the host country. Intermediaries cannot
inflict infinitely costly penalties on defaulting migrants in the legal sector. Third,
we assume that the attempt to obtain legal status in the host country increases
an illegal immigrant’s risks of being deported. It is exactly the fear of deporta-
tion that prevents immigrants from seeking police protection against illegal debt
collectors.
Finally, our model assumes rational behavior of migrants and intermediaries
and that nobody is forced or tricked to enter a debt/labor contract. We do not look
at involuntary slavery, which is an important problem, but is mostly unrelated to
international migration (Bales 2000). We also distinguish voluntary debt/labor
contracts under more or less perfect information from human trafficking, which
involves manipulation of information and kidnapping or coercion.
There is a growing theoretical literature that investigates the effects of host
country policies on illegal immigration. Ethier (1986) introduced a theoretical
framework in which governments optimally use a mix of external and internal
enforcement mechanisms, in particular, employer sanctions, to combat illegal
immigration. Recent papers have extended this framework to study the dynamic
issues of illegal immigration control. Epstein, Hilmann, and Weiss (1999) look at
the problem of migrants who enter legally and subsequently move into the illegal
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sector in order to avoid deportation. Chau (2001) argues that amnesties for illegal
immigrants can help deal with issues of time inconsistency of employer sanctions.
Epstein and Weiss (2001) investigate the strategic interaction of immigrants and
host countries and the optimal design of amnesties. Djajic (1999) argues that
stricter immigration control may be counterproductive as migrants may move
into new sectors and new areas, where new migration networks may form.
Our paper also builds on the model of Ethier (1986), but we do not look at the
dynamic aspects of immigration control. Rather, our contribution is to elaborate
the consequences of wealth-constraints and the interaction between migrants and
intermediaries in a theory of illegal migration. The model shows that under these
circumstances, stricter border controls and stricter deportation policies have quite
different effects on the flow and composition of illegal migrants.
In Section 5, we check the empirical consistency of the model with the scarce
data available. Section 6 relaxes some of the simplifying assumptions of the
model. We allow for debt collection in the legal sector of the host country and for
general distribution functions of wealth and skills. This establishes the additional
result that stricter border controls may result in an increase of debt-financed migra-
tion. We also sketch models of the effects of smuggler market power, of vertical
separation between smugglers and employers, and of legal entry of migrants.
The main results obtain under these different scenarios. In Section 7, we look
at employer sanctions. We show that there can be complementarities between
employer sanctions and deportation policies. Without employer sanctions, stricter
deportation promotes debt-financed migration and decreases self-financed migra-
tion. The total effect is hence ambigious. With intensified employer inspections
and sanctions, deportation policy becomes a more effective tool for decreasing
migration. In Section 8, we discuss normative considerations and how the the-
ory applies to human trafficking. We also look at parallels from the history of
migration through indentured servitude to the British colonies in the 17th and
18th century. Section 9 concludes.
2. Intermediaries and Migrants: Evidence
Most of the available sociological and criminological research on debt-financed
migration concerns illegal migration from China, which appears to be the most
important source country for long-haul illegal migration under wealth con-
straints. Similar but less well researched arrangements are also reported for other
source countries, for instance, the Balkans1 and India (INS 1998a), and for ille-
gal migration from Africa to Europe (Petros 2005). We here present evidence
about (a) information available to potential migrants, (b) debt/labor contracts
1. See Business Week, “Workers in Bondage,” November 27, 2000, pp. 56–67.
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between intermediaries and migrants, (c) the organization of intermediaries, and
(d) repayment of debt. The facts presented below motivate the setting of the model.
Information. There are important and often blurred distinctions between human
trafficking and smuggling (see Laczko 2002; Salt 2000). The availability of infor-
mation is crucial. Young women and children are sometimes tricked or forced
into prostitution, but it appears that most migrants know quite well what to expect
(Skeldon 2000). This concerns not only the costs and nonmonetary risks involved
with illegal migration, but also the initially poor living conditions in host coun-
tries. Chin and Zhang (2002) show that most Chinese migrants come from the
same few provinces. They benefit from the information of relatives and friends
who have migrated before. Some pieces of information may be lacking, but this
can only be a transitory phenomenon. O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) docu-
ment that even 19th-century migrants were well informed about their prospects,
at a time when information traveled by boat. There is little reason to believe that in
the presence of information and telecommunication technologies informational
frictions would persist for long.
Debt/labor Contract. Costs of migration are high, and only a few wealthy indi-
viduals or families can afford to self-finance migration. For instance, China–US
smuggling fees reached $35,000 in the mid-1990s and continued to rise to $40–
50,000 since then (Chin 1999; Kwong 1997, 2001; INS 1998b).2 The fees for
passage from China to Europe, or from India to the US are lower but still above
$20,000.3 It is interesting that within the same route (e.g., Fujian–New York) fees
do not seem to vary substantially across individuals.
A survey of 300 illegal Chinese immigrants from Fujian Province shows
that 90% had to borrow to pay the fee (Chin 1999). However, many potential
migrants have access to intermediaries who arrange air, sea, or ground transport,
provide forged documents, and assist in entering the country of destination. Long-
haul migration is organized (Schloenhardt 1999) in rather similar ways whether
migrants come from China, Russia (Finckenauer 2001), or Asia.4 The migrant
may or may not pay a down payment of up to 20% of the total fee. Smuggler
networks arrange the transfer to the host country, by sea, land, or air transport.
They also help to enter the host country. Upon arrival, the migrant is usually kept
in a “safe house” or sweatshop until the debt has been paid back to the smuggler
or related businesses. The migrant thus provides his labor as collateral to the
smuggler or its business partners until the debt is paid back.
2. See also New York Times, “Immigrant Smugglers, Too, Can Need a Lawyer’s Help,” Septem-
ber 23, 2000.
3. See INS (1998a); Business Week, “Workers in Bondage,” November 27, 2000, pp. 56–67, and
New York Times, “Chinese Town’s Main Export: Its Young Men,” June 26, 2000.
4. See INS (1998a); Business Week, “Workers in Bondage,” November 27, 2000, pp. 56–67.
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Organization of Intermediaries. There is agreement that the supply side of the
market for illegal migration consists of an oligopoly of well-organized and prof-
itable networks of intermediaries (INS 1998b; Schloenhardt 1999). Smugglers
often reinvest the returns into the smuggling business (Chin and Zhang 2002),
which indicates that they have long-term horizons. Reputational concerns appear
to keep smugglers and their partners from treating migrants too badly or from
extending their temporary servitude unduly. In particular, workers are usually
set free after the debt has been paid back (Chin 1999). Otherwise, new migrants
would barely enter contractual relationships with smugglers.
Intermediaries are not always integrated; smugglers may provide finance, but
sweatshops are often independent customers of the networks’ services. We know
rather little about contractual imperfections between smugglers and employers.
Furthermore, the degree of vertical integration is not important for our main
argument. Hence, the model builds on the assumption that intermediaries are
integrated. In Section 6.4 we briefly look at the vertical structure of intermediaries.
Repayment of Debt. Sometimes, relatives of the migrant pay the debt, but usually
the migrant works in businesses associated with the intermediary he used, and the
debt is paid back from his wage. In the case of Fujian Chinese, repayment takes
between half a year and four years with an average of 26 months (Chin 1999,
p. 119). Much of the illegal migration business appears to follow the spirit of the
debt/labor contract quite closely.
3. The Model
There are two risk-neutral players, M and I . A potential migrant M (“he,” occa-
sionally also called “the worker”) lives in the source country and wishes to migrate
to the host country, which does not permit legal entry. Thus, M needs the services
of a smuggler or intermediary I (“it”). The migrant is wealth-constrained, while
the intermediary has unlimited access to credit at zero cost. Government policies
are modeled in terms of comparative statics.
Below we posit two assumptions that are crucial for our theory. Their role is
further discussed and they are relaxed in Sections 6 and Section 7.
Assumption 1. Moving from the illegal to the legal sector of the host country
exposes illegal migrants to higher risks of being deported.
In the basic model, we will assume that the risk of being detected is zero as
long as the migrant stays in the illegal sector. (This makes sense in the absence of
systematic employer checks. In Section 7, we do consider the effect of employer
inspections.) But, when moving out of the illegal sector, a migrant becomes more
visible for public enforcement agencies, especially if he wants to obtain a legal
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job, and protection from smugglers. This exposes him to a higher risk of being
arrested and deported.
Assumption 2. It is more difficult to enforce the debt/labor contract when
migrants have obtained legal status.
This assumption states that being legalized, migrants receive some protection
against coercion and that intermediaries cannot inflict infinitely harsh punish-
ments on defaulting migrants. In the basic model, we assume for simplicity that
there is perfect enforcement of the debt/labor contract in the illegal sector whereas
in the legal sector M is perfectly protected from coercion by I . In Section 6,
we show that the results continue to hold when allowing for (imperfect) debt
collection in the legal sector.
3.1. Timing and Migration Contract
The parties maximize their respective payoffs UM (migrant) and UI (interme-
diary), over two periods. Without loss of generality, the time discount is zero.
Figure 1 shows the timing.
At the beginning of the first period, M makes I a take-it-or-leave-it offer.5
The contract specifies that I pays the costs of taking M to the illegal sector of
Figure 1. Timing.
5. This implies that the market for smugglers is competitive, a simplifying assumption that is not
important for the results. Section 6 allows for smugglers to have market power, which does not
change the main results. Notice also that the anecdotal evidence presented in Section 2 suggests that
there is competition between smugglers: fees depend on routes (the longer/difficult routes are more
expensive). Also, for any given route, there seems to be no price discrimination across migrants,
although this may be due to asymmetric information between smugglers and migrants, an effect that
we do not model.
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the host country and that M is supposed to make a down payment p1 that is not
exceeding the migrant’s initial wealth a, and a payment p2 in the second period.
The migrant owns no collateral other than his labor. Hence, the contract stipulates
that until p2 is paid, I or its business partners6 own the revenue of M’s work. This
contract puts M in a situation of temporary, voluntary servitude. The intermediary
either accepts or rejects the offer. If I rejects and M stays (index “s”) in the source
country, the payoffs are:
UMs = a + ω,
UIs = 0.
Here, ω is M’s wage in the source country. If I accepts the offer, M migrates.
Migration involves costs of entry into the host country C that are borne by I .
These costs C are the first policy variable of the model: Stricter border controls
increase C. During the second period, M either stays in the illegal sector working
for I or tries to enter the legal sector. In the illegal sector of the host country, I
appropriates the product of M’s work up to p2; M receives the residual. The total
payoff of M when staying in the illegal sector (index “i”) is thus
UMi = a − p1 + w˜ − p2,
where w˜ is the M’s wage in the illegal sector. The payoff of I is
UIi = p1 + p2 − C.
If M tries to receive legal status, there are benefits and costs. When the move is
successful, M’s wage increases from w˜ to w. As the legal system protects him
against coercion by I , M then reneges on the payment of p2. On the cost side, M
increases his risk of deportation. We normalize the deportation risk in the illegal
sector to nil, and label D the deportation risk when applying for legal status.
Probability D is the second policy variable of the model. Stricter deportation
policies increase D.
If M applies for legal status, his payoff is as follows (indices “l” if M receives
legal status, “d” if he is deported to the source country):
UM = UMl ≡ a − p1 + w, with probability 1 − D,
UM = UMd ≡ a − p1, with probability D.
If M becomes a legal resident, he defaults on his debt and receives his full legal
wage. If deported, M receives a−p1: He cannot pay p2 and does not receive any
6. It does not matter whether or not the intermediary is integrated with sweatshops. The migrant’s
debt and hence his workforce can be “sold” or “rented” to a business partner. This is modeled in
Section 6.
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labor income. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that migration and deportation
take up all M’s time so he forgoes the home country wage ω. One could also
consider a model where M would still be able to earn some wage at home upon
deportation; the results would not change qualitatively.
The respective payoffs for I are
UIl = UId = p1 − C,
because whenever M attempts to move to the legal sector, I does not receive p2,
whereas, at this stage, the cost of immigration C has already been sunk.
3.2. Assumptions on Wealth and Returns to Skills
Here we make some simplifying assumptions. There are only two types of
migrants—high- and low-skilled—and skill levels are public knowledge. We
assume the simplest possible returns to skills:
ω =
{
ωH , if a ≥ C
ωL, if a < C
, ωH > ωL,
and
w =
{
wH, if a ≥ C
wL, if a < C
, wH > wL.
Wealth and skills are perfectly correlated. If M has a ≥ C (a < C) cash, he
has high (low) skills—that is, high-skilled workers have enough cash to finance
their migration, whereas low-skilled workers do not. Also, workers who are
high- (low-) skilled in one country, are high- (low-) skilled in the other coun-
try as well. In Section 5, we show that our results hold qualitatively under relaxed
assumptions about wealth/skill correlations.
We further assume that in the illegal sector of the host country, the skill
premium is nil. That is, w˜ does not depend on whether ω = ωH or ω = ωL.
More generally, one can assume that the sensitivity of wage with respect to
skills is larger in the legal sector than in the illegal sector. This leads quali-
tatively to the same results. The assumption reflects the fact that irrespective
of their skills, illegal workers usually work in low-skilled jobs, for instance, in
the garment industry or restaurants (Kwong 2001). By definition, illegal jobs
are in such sectors because large and capital-intensive firms cannot operate
illegally.
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4. Equilibrium Migration and Policy Effects
As a benchmark, we first look at the case in which there is no intermediary. Here
M must pay the cost of migration up front, that is, the contract space degenerates
to p1 = C and p2 = 0. Under our assumptions, a low-skilled M (a < C) cannot
migrate because the liquidity constraint is binding. Furthermore, if
w˜ − C < ωH , (1)
high-skilled workers (a > C) are not interested in migrating to stay in the illegal
sector. In what follows we assume for simplicity that condition (1) holds. To
check whether high-skilled workers migrate in order to try attaining legal status,
we compare (1 − D)UMl + DUMd with UMs . This leads to a simple condition:
Migration only occurs if
(1 − D)wH > ωH + C. (2)
The left-hand side represents the expected wage in the legal sector (with probabil-
ity D, M is deported home), and the right-hand side is a skilled worker’s payoff
when staying in the source country. Summarizing, in this benchmark, only the
wealthier individuals migrate, and the policy effects are as expected. When D or
C increase, migration occurs for a narrower set of parameters a, w˜, wi . We look
now at the equilibrium with intermediaries and obtain the first proposition.
Proposition 1. Assume that condition (1) holds (i.e., the high-skilled work-
ers are not interested in migrating and remaining in the illegal sector). Then,
equilibrium is as follows:
(1) Low-skilled workers (a < C) migrate if and only if
a ≥ C − (w˜ − (1 − D)wL). (3)
The migrant does not attempt to move to the legal sector. The contract
stipulates p1, p2 such that p1 ≤ a, p2 ≥ 0 and p1 + p2 = C.
(2) High-skilled workers (a ≥ C) migrate if and only if (2) holds, and sub-
sequently try to attain legal status. The contract stipulates p1 = C and
p2 = 0.
(3) No other migration occurs.
To derive Proposition 1, consider first the migrant’s choice. He decides
whether or not to migrate and whether or not to try moving from the illegal to the
legal sector subsequently. We thus look at M’s payoffs for the three outcomes:
(i) stay in the source country, UMs = a + ω;
(ii) migrate and work in the illegal sector, UMi = a − p1 + w˜ − p2;
“zwu005060386” — 2006/10/20 — page 1095 — #11
Friebel and Guriev The Costs of Illegal Migration 1095
(iii) migrate and apply for legal status, (1 − D)UMl + DUMd = a − p1+
(1 − D)w.
The migrant maximizes his payoff subject to satisfying I ’s individual rationality
constraint (IR), that is, the expected payoff of I at the time the contract is signed
must be larger or equal zero. For high-skilled migrants this does not cause prob-
lems. They pay C up front to the intermediary and subsequently try to attain legal
status. To use a parallel from corporate finance, they behave like self-financed
entrepreneurs, who migrate if the net present value of migration exceeds the one
of staying home. The case of low-skilled workers is more complicated. They can
only pay a part of the total cost up front. The intermediary is hence only willing
to finance migration if the migrant does not attempt to move from the illegal to
the legal sector. Put differently, the debt/labor contract is “incentive-compatible”
if and only if w˜ − p2 ≥ (1 − D)wL, that is,
p2 ≤ w˜ − (1 − D)wL. (4)
Using another parallel from corporate finance, the liquidity-constrained (low-
skilled) migrant behaves like a debt-financed entrepreneur. There is a risk that he
defaults on his debt by trying to attain legal status. The term w˜ − (1 − D)wL
represents the value of the “pledgeable income” in the debt contract between M
and I . Pledgeable income (see Tirole 2001) is the maximum amount that M can
credibly commit to pay back; therefore it is also the maximum amount that I is
willing to lend M . Hence, the participation constraint of the intermediary UI ≥ 0
is satisfied only if a + w˜ − (1 −D)wL −C ≥ 0, which is equivalent to (3) stated
in the proposition.
Consider now the effect of changes in policies C and D on immigration of
high- and low-skilled workers.
Proposition 2. Comparative statics.
(1) An increase in C, that is, stricter border controls, decreases migration of
low-skilled and high-skilled migrants.
(2) An increase in D, that is, stricter deportation and legalization rules,
(i) increases migration of low-skilled workers, and (ii) decreases migration
of high-skilled workers.
Proposition 2 entails the main policy implication. Unlike in the benchmark,
stricter border enforcement and stricter deportation policies are not equivalent
when wealth constraints and intermediaries are taken into account. When C
increases, the effects on low- and high-skilled workers are similar—the value of
migration decreases. But when D increases, the effects are different. The utility of
low-skilled upon defaulting on p2 decreases. Thus the intermediary’s individual
rationality constraint is satisfied more often. As a result, condition (3) holds for
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a larger proportion of the low-skilled, involving that more of them can migrate.
However, condition (2) holds for less of the high-skilled, that is, fewer of them
migrate. Although the total effect on the flow of migrants is ambiguous, the skill
composition deteriorates when D increases. The effect on skill composition of
an increase in C is ambiguous, because it reduces the flow of both high- and
low-skilled migrants.
5. Empirical Consistency
The empirical literature on effects of policies on illegal immigration is rather lim-
ited. This is not surprising, as illegal immigration is by definition a clandestine
activity and reliable data are hard to obtain. Also, policy changes do not occur in
controlled environments. They are endogenous to the inflow of migrants, which
makes it difficult to properly correlate changes in policies with changes in immi-
grant flows. It is hence not surprising that little is known about the effects of the
migration policies. Hanson et al. (2002b) show that border controls deter immi-
gration to a limited extent and that they are very costly. Donato, Durand, and
Massey (1992) find that the stricter deportation rules and stricter border controls
in the framework of the Immigration Reform and Control Act had no significant
effect on the flow of migrants. There are a number of studies that look at the
effect of legalization on migrants’ earnings (for instance, Cobb-Clark and Kos-
soudji 2002; Rivera-Batiz 1999), but there are no studies that investigate how
changes in deportation and legalization policies affect migrant flows, which is
our main concern.
Although it is impossible to run regressions to test our theory, one could try
to calibrate the model to quantify policy effects. However, there are a number of
complications. First, we know very little about the determinants of demand for
services of smugglers and intermediaries. In our model we have abstracted from
the problem of estimating demand. The model is set up in partial equilibrium and
assumes that workers migrate provided that the net present value of migration is
positive and that they have a sufficient amount of wealth to pay the down-payment.
These two conditions then identify the range of parameters in which migration
is, in principle, possible and to show how this feasibility set is affected by border
controls and deportation policies. These statements are theoretically precise, but
to give empirical predictions we would need to know demand elasticities. Second,
policies chosen by governments are endogenous to the amount of migrants, their
origin, and the skill composition.
We therefore cannot generate full-fledged policy simulations, but we can use
data from the US to investigate the empirical consistency of the model: First, our
theory hinges on the idea that intermediaries will only deal with migrants who
can be expected to respect the terms of the contract, namely, those for whom the
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contract is incentive-compatible, see (4). We can check whether this theoretical
centerpiece of our model makes empirical sense. Second, our model is based on
the presumption that market transparency protects migrants from exploitation by
intermediaries. We investigate this as well.
For the consistency check of the migrant’s IC constraint, (w˜ − p2) ≥ (1 −
D)w,7 we proceed as follows. We use various sources about the magnitude of
the parameters (w˜, p2, w) and then look at what they imply for the remaining
parameter we have no estimates for: D, the deportation probability migrants face
when attempting to become legalized. Defining Do as the smallest D for which
the IC is satisfied, we can write Do = (p2 + w − w˜)/w.
It is useful to first express the wage in the legal sector as w = (1 + l)w˜,
that is, as the wage the migrant receives when staying in the illegal sector plus
a premium l associated with legalization. The empirical equivalent of w˜ is the
net present value (NPV) of working illegally in the US. We compute the NPV
by taking the average minimum wage in the US, $6.15 per hour (US Dept of
Labor 2005). This is a reasonable estimate of the average market wage of illegal
migrants in industries as garment, restaurant, or other services. We assume that a
migrant works 45 hours for 52 weeks per year over a period of 40 years.
For l, we use Cobb-Clark and Kossoudji’s (2002) estimates of 14–24% legal-
ization premia. They have looked at Mexican immigrants, and skill premia may be
different for Chinese and other long-haul immigrants, who may have different skill
distributions. Nonetheless, to our knowledge, these are the best available proxies.
Debt repayment p2 can be assumed to be between $25,000 and $35,000, as immi-
grants usually pay around 20% of the total cost of migration as down-payment
(Chin 1999).
We have run simulations using different interest rates. The estimates for Do
are in the range between 7.5% (assuming an interest rate of 3% for the NPV,
p2 of $25,000, and zero legalization premium) and 28% (5%, $35,000, and a
legalization premium of 24%). The scenario that seems most realistic to us yields
a Do of 19% (5%, $25,000, 14%). These estimates seem sensible; moreover, the
simulation results show that our theory would be empirically testable if we had
data on the deportation risk of migrants who move out of the shadow.
As for the second consistency check, it is difficult to judge to what extent
the average smuggling fee ($30,000–50,000) reflects some market power. How-
ever, we can use the figures we have collected to check whether—as our theory
assumes—reputational concerns keep smugglers from exploiting migrants “too
much” ex post. In order to do so, notice that the average migrant from China
pays back his or her debt of $25–35,000 in 26 months; the maximum length of
debt repayment we know about is four years (Chin 1999). Assuming as before
7. Notice that because in the basic model, only low-skilled migrants would enter a debt/labor
contract, we can hence omit the index L.
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that a migrant works 45 hours per week and at the minimum wage of $6.15,
the value of this work would be around $31,000 for 26 months and $58,000 for
four years. Taking into account the value of (low-quality) food and housing that
migrants receive while paying back their debt, these figures do not indicate much
exploitation.
Last but not the least we should verify whether migrants’ acceptance of
debt/labor contracts is rational. Estimates of the GDP per capita in China in terms
of purchasing power parity are in the range of $4,000 (e.g., CIA World Factbook
2005). This implies that the net present value of migration, even taking into
account the wages at home and the costs of migration, is large—about $180,000.
6. Theoretical Robustness, Extensions
Our theory builds on two crucial assumptions. First, we assume that when an
illegal immigrant tries to acquire legal status, he increases his risks of being
deported. In Assumption 1 of the model, we have normalized the deportation risk
in the illegal sector to nil. This is not necessary for the model to hold. It suffices
that stricter deportation policies increase the deportation risk from the legal sector
to a larger extent than from the illegal sector. Otherwise, they would not decrease
migrants’ incentives to default on debt repayments. The effect of stricter border
controls and stricter deportation policies would then be equivalent.
Assumption 1 makes sense for a number of reasons. Moving from the illegal
to the legal sector makes migrants more visible and vulnerable. They have to
register with government agencies, which increases the risks of deportation.
Furthermore, in the absence of raids on employers, the chances to detect ille-
gal immigrants are very low, unless they get in contact with the legal sector.
Section 7 models worksite inspections explicitly.
The second major assumption is that debt/labor contracts cannot be enforced
in the legal sector. In Section 6.1 we show that our model is robust to allowing for
the possibility of debt collection in the legal sector. In Section 6.2, we sketch a
generalized model that does not hinge on assumptions concerning the correlation
of skills and wealth, or on specific distributions. In Section 6.3, we briefly look
at direct legal entry into the host country, and in Section 6.4 at the allocation of
bargaining power between workers, smugglers and employers of illegal migrants.
6.1. Debt Collection in the Legal Sector
According to Assumption 2, debt p2 can only be collected in the illegal sector.
Assume now that there is some possibility of debt collection, even if M transits
successfully to the legal sector. As the legal system of the host country provides
protection for M, debt collection is then more costly for the intermediary. One
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could model default and potential debt collection between M and I as an explicit
game. Here we focus on checking robustness only. Hence, it is sufficient to look
at a reduced form and to simply assume that debt is collected in the legal system
with probability ξ ∈ [0, 1].
Then, omitting index L at the legal-sector wage w, M’s incentive-
compatibility constraint becomes less restrictive:
(w˜ − p2) ≥ (1 − D)(w − ξp2).
The pledgeable-income constraint (4) is rewritten as follows:
p2 ≤ w˜ − (1 − D)w1 − (1 − D)ξ .
The wealth constraint of the migrant is still p1 ≤ a, and the intermediary’s
participation constraint is
p1 + p2 ≥ C.
Adding up the three inequalities, we find that debt-financed migration is feasible
whenever
C ≤ a + w˜ − (1 − D)w
1 − (1 − D)ξ . (5)
The right-hand side of (5) increases in D, because w > w˜ ≥ w˜ξ . Hence, our
main result remains intact: Stricter deportation policies facilitate debt-financed
migration.
Further, the intermediary does not let the migrant go to collect debt from their
wage in the legal sector if the following holds:8
a + w(1 − D)ξ < C. (6)
That is, for ξ sufficiently low such that (6) is satisfied, stricter deportation poli-
cies increase migration. Conversely, if (6) does not hold, I would let M go to
work in the legal sector. Given the well-documented debt/labor contracts between
intermediaries and migrants, this seems to be rarely the case.
6.2. Generalized Model
We now consider a continuum of workers and skills; we also drop the assump-
tion of perfect correlation between skills and wealth. These changes are useful
8. We thank a referee for pointing to this issue.
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Figure 2. Migration flows in a generalized model as a function of wage at home ω, wealth a, wage
in the legal sector w, and wage in the illegal sector w˜.
to check robustness of the comparison of stricter border controls vs. stricter
deportation policies. They also generate an additional result: Stricter border
controls may induce illegal migrants to move from self-financed migration to
debt/labor contracts.
Assume that the source country is populated with a continuum of workers
whose mass is normalized to 1. The workers differ in three dimensions: home
wage ω, wealth a, and wage in the legal sector w. All three parameters are likely
to be correlated with the skills of workers; therefore, they should be positively
correlated with each other. We do not make any specific assumptions about the
joint distribution of the parameters; rather we allow for some joint density function
f (ω, a,w) on R3+. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that there is no
skill premium in the illegal sector (w˜ is the same for all workers). Relaxing
this assumption would not change the results, but would generate economically
uninteresting distinctions.
The analysis is similar to that of Section 4. Lemma 1 (in the Appendix) states
the precise expressions for different types of migrant flows. Figure 2 plots these
flows as a function of migrant wages w, and initial wealth a, given the wage at
home ω. Case (a) represents the case of relatively skilled workers for whom ω +
C > w˜, that is, the wage in the home country plus the cost of migration outweighs
the income from working in the host country’s illegal sector. Such workers will
only migrate in order to transit to the legal sector; therefore only self-financed
migration is feasible (a > C).9 Migration pays off whenever (1 −D)w−C > ω
or, equivalently, w > (ω + C)/(1 − D).
Case (b) represents relatively low-skilled workers with ω + C < w˜. Com-
pared to the basic model, new cases emerge when we drop the assumption of
perfect correlation between skills and wealth: Relatively low-skilled workers may
be sufficiently wealthy (a ≥ C) to migrate without engaging in a debt/labor con-
tract. Depending on their wages in the legal sector, they either try to transit to the
legal sector (northeast of point B), or they stay in the illegal sector (southeast of
point B).
9. As the IC of these migrants is never satisfied, intermediaries cannot break even when doing
business with them.
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Figure 3. Comparative statics for the low-skilled workers (ω + C < w˜). The left illustrates the
effect of an increase from C to C ′; the right shows the impact of an increase in D.
For those who are wealth-constrained (a < C), the line EB represents the
incentive constraint (the pledgeable income equals the amount borrowed C − a).
Notice that the intermediary only finances wealth-constrained workers with rela-
tively low skills (below EB). If the migrant can earn too high a wage in the legal
sector, he will default on debt, and the pledgeable income is not sufficient to cover
the intermediary’s costs.
Comparative statics results can be found in Lemma 2 in the Appendix. First,
we look at the impact of stricter border enforcement policies (an increase from C
to C′). Such a policy change has effects on: (a) the migration flow of high-skilled
workers for whom ω + C > w˜; (b) the migration flow of low-skilled workers;
(c) the proportion of workers with ω + C > w˜, who only migrate to work in the
legal sector, and hence must self-finance migration.
Effect (c) is obvious. Effect (a) is also straightforward. In Figure 2 (left)
point A moves northeast and migration decreases. Effect (b) is plotted on the
left-hand side of Figure 3. First, the increase in C directly reduces the flow of
self-financed low-skilled migrants. Second, it shifts line EB to the right; this
reduces the flow of debt-financed low-skilled. Third, there is an interesting new
effect. Area II (below EB) depicts the flow of workers moving from self-financed
migration to debt/labor contracts when C increases. Their wealth does not suffice
anymore to pay the cost of migration themselves, but the pledgeable income is
large enough for the intermediary to break even. Notice also that while an increase
in C reduces the flow of all types of migrants, the effect on skill composition is
ambiguous.
Stricter deportation policies (an increase of D to D′) do not affect condition
(1). Thus, there is no shift between the groups of workers for whom ω+C > w˜ or
ω + C < w˜. Migration of the highly skilled decreases (point A, Figure 2, moves
northeast). The graph on the right side of Figure 3 shows the effect on low-
skilled. The net present value of migration to the legal sector decreases. Thus, the
wealthier low-skilled workers prefer migrating and staying in the illegal sector,
rather than trying to transit to the legal sector (area IV).10 However, when moving
10. Notice that a similar effect is discussed in Epstein, Hilmann, and Weiss (1999).
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to the legal sector becomes less attractive, it is also easier for the intermediary
to recover its investment—the pledgeable income of wealth-constrained workers
increases. Hence, a greater number of low-skilled workers migrate (area III).
As more low-skilled and less high-skilled migrate, migrant skill composition
deteriorates.
These comparative statics suggest that the interaction of policies is more
subtle than the simple model would suggest. In the framework of the simple
model, there is a quick solution to stop migration through debt/labor contracts
without changing total inflow of workers. The government could decrease D, and
as total immigration increases (owing to more high-skilled immigration) it could
increase C to reduce overall migration to the original level. The general model,
however, shows that this policy package would fail, because an increase in C
creates new debt/labor immigrants.
The following proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 3. Effects of policy variables in the generalized model.
(1) An increase in C reduces migrant flows and has ambiguous effects on the
skill composition of migrants.
(2) An increase in D has ambiguous effects on migrant flows and reduces the
average skills of migrants.
6.3. Legal Entry
We have only considered illegal immigration above, but the results are robust
to allowing for the direct legal entry. In reality, there are limited possibilities of
direct legal entry into the US, for instance, through lotteries, or for very wealthy
immigrants: Section 203(b)(5) of the US Immigration and Nationality Act pro-
vides permanent resident status for immigrants who invest $1 million in the US
economy.11 Suppose that the cost of direct legal entry is L. Wealthy high-skilled
workers compare the utility associated with illegal migration and a subsequent
attempt to legalize, a−C+w(1−D), to the utility of direct legal entry, a−L+w.
Direct legal entry is therefore chosen if
w > (L − C)/D and a > L.
Therefore, the migrants with highest skills and largest wealth will immigrate via
direct legal entry. However, types with intermediate wealth and skills choose
illegal entry with a plan to acquire legal status after arriving at destination.
11. http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/residency/investment.htm, the US Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Service.
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6.4. Monopoly Power and the Role of Employers
In the model, migrants have full bargaining power. This has allowed us to identify
the largest set of workers for whom migration is feasible (see the comment in
Section 5). In reality, intermediaries may have some market power. Furthermore,
unlike in our model, smugglers and employers may not maximize joint profit, but
they may be vertically separated. This section provides an idea how these issues
can be handled in the framework of our model.
For simplicity, we keep the assumption of symmetric information and assume
that the intermediary is a monopoly. This implies that I , rather than M , has all
the bargaining power. Suppose also that there are firms that employ the migrant
in the illegal sector. They are separate from the intermediary, and it is realistic to
assume perfect competition between employers. The smuggler collects p1 from
M and sells the debt claim of p2 to the employer. If the employer expects the
worker to stay in the illegal sector, the employer will be willing to pay p2 to the
smuggler. Otherwise the employer will not pay anything.
Worker M has no bargaining power in the illegal sector, and his outside
option of a transit to the competitive legal sector provides a payoff of (1 − D)w.
The employer’s payoff is therefore w˜ − (1 − D)w. This is also the maximum
amount the employer would want to pay for the debt claim. Hence p2 ≤ w˜ −
(1 −D)w, very much like in the simple model above. As I ’s rent is p1 +p2 −C
must be positive, and the financial constraint implies p1 ≤ a, we have the same
constraint for the feasibility of debt-financed migration as before: w˜−(1−D)w +
a ≥ C.
The smuggler will set p1 to make M’s participation constraint a − p1 +
(1 − D)w − ω ≥ 0 binding. In contrast to the model in Section 3, all rents are
now appropriated by I . However, the effect of policy variable D is the same.
When D increases, I decreases p1 to keep workers interest in migrating (i.e.,
−p1 + [1 − D]w is kept constant). However, the increase in D involves that
w˜ − (1 − D)w + a ≥ C holds for a smaller number of workers.
This sketch of analysis is only a first step for studying vertical integration
and separation, and the issue of market power between smugglers and employers.
More interesting tradeoffs may be generated when one introduces asymmetric
information, contractual incompleteness, and specific investments. Yet, given how
little evidence there is on the relationship between smugglers and employers, we
prefer not to speculate on those issues in this paper.
7. Employer Sanctions
In the US, worksite inspections are rarely carried out and employer sanctions
tend to have little bite. According to Hanson et al. (2002a), in 1990, less than
8% of INS enforcement manpower was devoted to worksite inspections, and less
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than 1% of the 1.5 million apprehensions were made at worksites. A report of the
US Department of Justice (1996) stated that
[e]ven if the illegal alien work force in the US were to remain static at 2 million
and INS were to meet its removal targets, INS worksite removals would equal
less than 0.1 percent of the illegal alien work force and could be expected to
have a statistically insignificant effect on the remaining work force.
Although government officials occasionally announce a tougher stance on
employers, little appears to have changed. The situation is similar in the UK. The
IOM (2003) reports that the number of UK employers who were fined under the
Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 were nil in 1997, one in 1998, nine in 1999,
and 23 in 2000.
The situation is different in continental Europe. According to Martin and
Miller (2000), sanctions in France and Germany are much stricter than in the
US. In France, for instance, employers can be penalized to up to 1,000 times
the monthly minimum wage (e1,286 in 2004), whereas in the US the maximum
fine is $10,000. Germany spends about five times more per worker than the US
to prevent the employment of illegal foreign workers. Germany has about 1,500
labor-market inspectors for a labor market with about 40 million workers: in 1994,
the US had 245 INS worksite investigators (and an additional 900 Department of
labor inspectors) for about 130 million workers. In France and Germany, labor
inspectors can inspect any site without prior notification. In the US they must give
advance notice of three days.
Given high unemployment in many European countries, it can be expected
that employer sanctions and inspections will be intensified. The model can be read-
ily extended to take into account employer sanctions. They have similar effects as
increases in border enforcement. Furthermore, we have conjectured before that
stricter deportation policies can only have deterrent effects on illegal migrants if
raids on employers of illegal migrants are intensified. We here show formally the
existence of such complementarities.
Suppose first that in the illegal sector, there is a probability E of a raid. Then,
the worker is deported to the source country, and the employer is fined for F
dollars. In this case worker automatically defaults on debt.
The worker’s payoff in the illegal sector is therefore
UMi = a − p1 + (1 − E)(w˜ − p2).
The payoff of I (denoting the coalition of smuggler and employer) has a
payoff of
UIi = p1 + (1 − E)p2 − C − EF.
The worker’s incentive compatibility constraint becomes
a − p1 + (1 − E)(w˜ − p2) ≥ a − p1 + (1 − D)w.
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Adding up the liquidity constraint p1 ≤ a, we obtain p1 + p2(1 − E) ≤ a +
w˜(1 − E) − w(1 − D). Therefore the participation constraint UIi ≥ 0 implies
a ≥ C − (w˜ − (1 − D)w) + E(w˜ + F). (7)
Raids E and harshness of punisment F have similar effects on debt-financed
migration as C. The stricter these employer sanctions, the lower debt-financed
migration. Yet the impact ofD is unaffected. Stricter deportation policies facilitate
debt-financed migration (holding border enforcement C, employer raids E, and
employer sanctions F constant).12
Consider now a more sophisticated and probably a more realistic setting in
which there exist complementarities between D and E. Assume that the same
deportation policy is applied to both those applying for legal status and those
caught in worksite inspections. Then the probability of being detected and sent
home associated with a job in the illegal sector is E = EˆD, and the policy maker
chooses Eˆ rather thanE. The pledgeable income becomes (1−EˆD)w˜−(1−D)w.
Hence debt-financed migration occurs if
a ≥ C + EˆD(w˜ + F) − w˜ + (1 − D)w. (8)
In this framework, the effect of stricter deportation policies on the pledgeable
income −w˜Eˆ + w is weaker, but it remains positive. As the legal sector wage
w > w˜ ≥ Eˆw˜, stricter deportation policies still facilitate migration.
Proposition 4. In a model with employer sanctions, the impact of policy is as
follows:
(1) Stricter border enforcement C and stricter employer sanctions Eˆ decrease
illegal debt-financed migration.
(2) Stricter deportation policy D increases illegal debt-financed migration.
(3) Stricter employer sanctions Eˆ weaken the positive effect of deportation policy
D on debt-financed migration.
The last statement essentially emphasizes the complementarities between
policies. Without employer sanctions, stricter deportation promotes debt-financed
migration and decreases self-financed migration, so the total effect may be positive
or negative. However, the stronger the employer sanctions, the less important
is the positive effect of deportation policy on debt-financed migration. Hence,
deportation policies become a more effective tool for decreasing migration. This
result is in line with Ethier (1986) and more recent work, for instance, Chau
(2001), who argue that policy instruments should be combined to be effective.
12. If D and E are changed together (e.g., increased by the same amount), then the stricter policies
do deter migration as long as the employer sanctions are strict enough (F > w˜ − w).
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8. Further Implications
Our model can provide some insights about the effect of amnesties on deci-
sions to migrate. The existing literature on amnesties (e.g., Chau 2001 and
Epstein and Weiss 2001) does not consider financial constraints. Therefore,
because each amnesty raises expectations for future amnesties, it results in
higher incentives to migrate. This is true in the model when only self-financed
migration is considered. Indeed, if ex ante both migrants and intermediaries
anticipate a sufficiently high chance of amnesty (lower D, in terms of our
model), then high-skilled migration should increase (part 2 of Proposition 2).
However, once one takes into account the impact of expected amnesties on
the debt/labor contract, a countervailing effect arises. Anticipating that immi-
grants may obtain legal status through amnesty, intermediaries will refuse to lend.
Hence, more of the wealth-constrained migrants stay in the source country, which
decreases low-skilled migration. Thus, an expected amnesty may either increase
or decrease total immigration, but it improves the skill composition of incoming
migrants.
Our model takes a positive perspective. We abstain from welfare statements as
the welfare analysis is very complicated. It is in the interest of wealth-constrained
immigrants to engage in debt/labor contracts, because they could not migrate
otherwise.13 Lenient deportation policies can hence reduce the joint welfare of
immigrants and the host country. However, this does not take into account a
number of external effects: (i) the negative impact of high-skilled emigration on
the source country (“brain drain”); (ii) the impact of immigration on the low-
skilled domestic workers whose retraining is costly and take time,14 (iii) the
impact of lenient deportation policies on the stock of illegal immigrants who have
already entered the country; (iv) the ethical concerns that sweatshops and illegal
immigration raise; and (v) the risk that the law enforcement system is corrupted.
The welfare analysis becomes even more involved in the case of immigration
amnesties which are hard to study in a static framework.
We have throughout the paper made a distinction between human smug-
gling, which assumes rational contracting between intermediary and migrants,
and trafficking, which involves manipulation and coercion. While we want to
be careful to expand the model’s reach to trafficking, it seems that more lenient
deportation policies are more desirable, because they help trafficking victims and
reduce the profitability of trafficking networks. Although the ex ante analysis of
13. In our model, servitude is voluntary. Stricter deportation policies that facilitate debt/labor
migration therefore benefit immigrants. As argued in Genicot (2002), it is quite hard to construct
an economic argument where voluntary bonded labor is against the worker’s interest, unless one
introduces externalities in credit markets.
14. These workers do not want low-skilled immigration, but may benefit from high-skilled
immigration: see Zimmermann (1995).
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our model does not hold for trafficking victims, the profitability of the trafficking
industry depends to a similar extent on the strictness of deportation rules as the
one of the smuggling industry. Hence there are similar implications, provided that
the victims of trafficking have some possibility to escape and contact the police.
Our logic does not apply otherwise.
Although illegal migration is a relatively new phenomenon by historical stan-
dards, it bears resemblance with the past. Past migration waves were driven by
income differentials in similar ways as current migration. It has always been
expensive to migrate, and migrants have always been subject to financial con-
straints.15 What distinguishes the present wave of migration from the previous
ones is that, nowadays, host country governments undertake efforts to deter rather
than to encourage migration.
There are nonetheless striking parallels to indentured servitude. Between
one-half and two-thirds of all white immigrants coming to the North American
British colonies between 1630 and the American Revolution came as indentured
servants. To finance the passage to the colonies, they committed their workforce
for a certain period of time (Galenson 1984). Initially, a vertically integrated
company provided finance and transportation, and owned workshops employing
the immigrants. Later, this industry converged to a structure similar to the one
observed in the modern world; the company only provided finance and transporta-
tion but then sold the debt claim, and hence migrants’ workforce to independent
employers in the colonies. Debt holders respected the terms of contracts and set
workers free after they had paid their debt. Usually this took three to seven years.
Many indentured servants tried to run away, but as the contracts between migrants
and debt holders were fully legal, captured servants were penalized and sent back
to the debt holders. This made sense because the government was interested in an
inflow of cheap labor. In terms of our theory, the host country could not further
decrease the cost of migration C (it was dictated by high relative transportation
costs rather then by policy-driven barriers), so the only way to increase immi-
gration was to enforce debt/labor contracts and sustain indentured servitude as a
labor market institution.
The main difference between indentured servitude and modern sweatshop
employment is that today’s host countries do want to combat illegal migration.
Our model shows, however, that by applying stricter immigration policies, they
may contribute to the spread of debt/labor contracts. First, stricter border and
visa policies increase cost of entry and make financial constraints binding for a
greater number of potential immigrants. Second, stricter deportation policies help
enforce debt/labor contracts in a way similar to that of the British colonies in the
17th and 18th centuries.
15. See Chiswick and Hatton (2002) and O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) for an overview on
current and past migration.
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9. Concluding Remarks
The rather poor data situation does not yet allow us to carry out a comprehensive
empirical evaluation of immigration policies. There is thus scope for theoretical
analysis to better understand the effects of different policies and the costs that
may be associated with them. We have presented a theory of illegal immigration
in which the interaction between migrants and intermediaries is crucial.
In this realistic framework stricter border controls and stricter deportation
policies do not affect the flow and composition of illegal immigration in similar
ways. Whereas stricter border controls reduce migrant flows and have ambiguous
effects on skill composition, stricter deportation policies have ambiguous effects
on flows, but unambiguously worsen skill composition. We have also shown that
stricter border controls may induce migrants to move from self-financed migration
to temporary servitude and that there can be complementarities between depor-
tation policies and worksite inspections. These effects arise in a straightforward
way once financial constraints and the role of intermediaries are considered, and
they seem to be in line with the existing empirical evidence.
Appendix: Comparative Statics in the Generalized Model
Straightforward calculations yield the following Lemmas.
Lemma 1. Equilibrium migration flows under the assumptions of Section 6.2
are as follows.
(1) Inflow of migrants, financed through a debt/labor contract, staying in the
illegal sector:
nidebt =
∫ C
0
da
∫ w˜−C
0
dω
∫ w˜+a−C
1−D
0
f (ω, a,w)dw.
(2) Inflow of self-financed migrants, trying to move to the legal sector:
nlself =
∫ ∞
C
da
∫ ∞
0
dω
∫ ∞
max{w˜,ω+C}
1−D
f (ω, a,w)dw.
(3) Inflow of self-financed migrants, staying in the illegal sector:
niself =
∫ ∞
C
da
∫ w˜−C
0
dω
∫ w˜
1−D
0
f (ω, a,w)dw.
Indices debt and self represent sources of financing; indices l and i represent
legal and illegal sector.
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Lemma 2. Comparative statics.
(i) An increase in C decreases both legal and illegal migration, decreases self-
financed migration. The effect on debt-financed migration is ambiguous.
∂nlself
∂C
< 0; ∂(n
i
debt + niself)
∂C
< 0; ∂(n
i
self + nlself)
∂C
< 0.
(ii) An increase in D decreases legal migration, decreases self-financed migra-
tion, but increases illegal migration, both debt-financed and self-financed.
∂nlself
∂D
< 0;∂(n
l
self + niself)
∂D
> 0;
∂nidebt
∂D
> 0;∂n
i
self
∂D
> 0.
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